Females tend to have higher medical expenditures than males of the same age. As a result, some of the observed gap in wages between males and females in the United States could be a compensating differential for the cost of employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI). This paper first shows that existing work on the role of ESI in the gender wage gap does not separately identify the effect of ESI from plausible alternatives. The paper then uses an improved source of identification to determine how much of the gender wage gap can be attributed to ESI. Findings suggest the portion of the gender wage gap attributable to ESI is smaller than prior estimates in the literature and is statistically no different to zero once individual medical expenses are included as a control. Identification comes from the exogenous variation provided by the Affordable Care Act's employer mandate. Estimation uses a difference-in-difference framework with data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey.
Introduction
This paper asks if differences in medical expenditures contribute to the gap between male and female wages? The question arises because employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) is experience rated. Experience rating means that insurance premiums for firms are a function of employees' actual medical expenditures. This creates a cost wedge between males and females because females tend to have higher medical expenditures and employee contributions towards ESI cannot legally vary by gender. 1 At the margin, this means that firms who offer ESI will University of Louisville, conor.lennon@louisville.edu 1 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) forbids discriminatory distinctions in benefit generosity and employee contributions. HIPAA also makes it illegal to assess employee health insurance contributions prefer to hire males unless female wages are free to adjust to compensate for how their health care expenditures contribute to insurance costs for the firm.
The cost wedge is not trivial. Cylus et al. (2011) found that per capita annual health care spending in 2004 was 32 percent more for females than for males. Bertakis et al. (2000) , Woolhandler and Himmelstein (2007) , and Bertakis and Azari (2010) also show female spending is higher. The same pattern is evident in the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality's Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). For those aged 18-64 and employed, annual medical expenditures were $3,388 for females and $2,272 for males (using 2006-2014 data) in 2014 dollars. Cowan and Schwab (2016) ask if the difference in expenditures could be part of the gender wage gap. Using NLSY and MEPS data they find that the gap between male and female wages at firms that offer ESI is wider than at firms who do not offer ESI. They take this as evidence that ESI contributes to the gender wage gap. However, their empirical strategy is not ideal.
Firstly, there could be differences between firms that do and do not offer ESI that magnify wage differences between different groups. One example is firm size (number of employees).
In their estimates, Cowan and Schwab control for firm size but do not do so differentially by gender. 2 This confounds identification because firm size has been shown to increase the earnings of similarly productive workers (see Oi and Idson, 1999) . If females have unobservable differences in productivity then the gender wage gap will be magnified at bigger firms. 3 As ESI is more common in large firms, Cowan and Schwab are potentially picking up a combination of the effect of ESI and firm size on wages.
Secondly, even if the effects on female wages were caused only by ESI, it is not clear if that reflects a causal relationship between gender and wages due to ESI or between individual medical expenditures and wages. Essentially, Cowan and Schwab's approach assumes that the characteristic firms are responding to is gender but it could also be medical expenditures at the individual level while producing the same empirical results. To separate the two, an empirical based on claims experience, receipt of health care services, genetic information or disability. See https://www.shrm. org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/hr-qa/pages/offeringdifferentbenefitsfordifferentemployees.aspx for more on this.
2 At least that is what is described in the footnotes to Table 3 in their paper (pp. 108) . 3 Note that this claim does not require that females are less able.
approach should consider if males and females who tend to have similar medical expenses face similar labor market outcomes.
In either case average female wages will be lower. However, one reflects a relationship between gender and wage outcomes that an individual female cannot affect while the other implies a potentially efficient system of wages and benefits tailored to the individual irrespective of gender. The difference between the two is subtle but important for understanding the policy implications of Cowan and Schwab's findings. Their approach implies that females who have lower medical expenditures will be statistically-discriminated against because of the higher expenditures of other females. In such a situation it would be easy to make a case for a policy response to "level the playing field." On the other hand, if males and females with similar medical expenses face similar reductions in wages, then Cowan and Schwab's findings reflect market forces: males and females who tend to use more medical services are paid relatively lower wages.
To illustrate and resolve these issues, this paper first confirms Cowan and Schwab's main findings using recent MEPS data. Findings suggest that the gap in wages between men and women is largest at firms that offer ESI. The paper then asks if firm size also increases that gender wage gap, as a falsification test. The goal is not to identify how firm size contributes to the gender wage gap. Instead, this exercise only demonstrates that Cowan and Schwab's strategy may not be accounting for differences between firms who do and do not offer ESI.
The paper also tests the validity of Cowan and Schwab's approach by examining if wages at firms who do and do not offer ESI follow similar patterns for other groups who have differences in medical expenses. For example, MEPS respondents who identify themselves as black tend to have slightly lower medical expenditures but also lower wages than whites. If ESI causes the wage gap between males and females to widen, then ESI should narrow the black-white wage gap. As another example, the college wage premium should be smaller when a firm offers ESI because college graduates have higher medical expenditures than those who do not complete college. In both of these examples, the effect of ESI on wages goes against what Cowan and Schwab's approach would predict (see Section 4). This suggests that comparing wage gaps for workers at firms who offer ESI to the same gap at firms that do not cannot identify the effect of ESI on the gender wage gap.
The paper then uses the ACA's employer mandate as an improved source of identification.
Because the mandate requires all firms with more than 50 employees to offer coverage from 2014 onwards, it creates a natural experiment to test if females are paid less due to employers having to offer ESI. Relying on the employer mandate for identification means that the paper is focused on anticipatory effects. Firms were informed of the Act's mandate in early 2010 and theory would suggest forward-looking employers would reduce their demand for females in the lead up to implementation -employing fewer females, paying females a lower wage, or both. 4
A forward-looking approach is appropriate in this instance because employment is an ongoing relationship and the employer mandate required coverage to be in place for all full time workers by 2014 (although that date was later relaxed). 5 Forward-looking firms could minimize the cost of compliance with the mandate because coverage costs for 2014 were to be based on the expected costs of each firm's employee pool in 2013.
A focus on anticipatory effects has the advantage of avoiding other ACA provisions which might affect labor market outcomes after 2014. The most obvious one would be the ACA's health insurance exchanges. These exchanges provide affordable coverage options outside of employment. 6 Examining the period after 2014 could cloud identification if these exchanges or other ACA provisions affected self-employment patterns, job search efforts, or alleviated health coverage-related job lock differentially for obese workers (see Lennon, 2017 for more on this).
Importantly, relying on the employer mandate for identification avoids comparisons across firms who do and do not offer ESI by choice. Moreover, because the MEPS data contains individual medical expenditures, this paper's empirical approach can test if males and females who have similar medical expenses face similar labor market outcomes.
4 Garrett and Kaestner (2015) , Even and MacPherson (2015) , and Mathur et al. (2016) also assume employers would be forward-looking. They consider how the ACA affected part-time employment because only workers who work more than 30 hours per week would have to be provided coverage. 5 In the data used in this paper, more than 60% of workers at firms affected by the employer mandate had employment tenure of 2 years or more. 6 The estimates presented in the paper include data from 2014 as the employer mandate was later delayed to 2015. Excluding or including 2014 does little to the results presented.
As a preview of the paper's main findings, the effects of the employer mandate appear to confirm that females are paid less due to ESI. Specifically, at firms that are likely to be affected by the ACA's employer mandate, estimates suggest male employees will earn $1.59 more per hour than a female counterpart due to ESI when controls for individual expenditures are not included. The effect is significant at the 1% level. However, these findings are not robust to controls for individual medical expenditures. In particular, the estimated effect of ESI on the wage gap decreases to $1.18 per hour and is no longer statistically different from zero when controls for medical expenditures at the individual level are included. The effect of individual medical expenses is estimated to be a $0.16 reduction in hourly wages for each unit difference in log medical expenditures and is significant at the 1% level.
If a full-time worker works about 2,000 hours per year, a $0.16 per hour effect amounts to just a $320 difference in annual wages for a log unit difference in medical expenditures (for example, $3,000 versus $1,500). This relatively small pass-through is perhaps not that surprising given medical expenditures (such as insurance premiums) paid by firms are tax deductible, some of the cost would be borne by the employee via cost sharing, and some firms might have lots of turnover giving them little incentive to prepare for the mandate. In addition, the estimates can reflect only anticipatory effects as firms affected by the employer mandate were not required to provide coverage until January 2014. 7 This dampens the effect individual medical expenditures could have (relative to group level differences) because some medical expenditures in that time period would be random and unpredictable. Medical expenditures associated with one-off events can provide no information on future medical expenditures for the individual, by definition. On the other hand, individuals who have expenditures that are ongoing and predictable might see a greater pass-through of medical expenditures. However, this paper does not attempt to examine these issues. That is, estimating the level and robustness of medical expenditure pass-through at the individual level is not a goal of this paper.
Instead, the paper has two clear goals. One, to show that identifying the effects of employment benefits on various groups using wage gaps across firms that offer ESI and do not offer ESI is not a valid empirical strategy. Two, to show that it is not at all clear that employers pay 7 In February 2014, the employer mandate deadline was moved to 2015 for firms with more than 100 employees and to 2016 for firms with fewer than 100 employees. certain groups lower wages, even when using an improved source of identification, because their medical expenditures tend to be higher than other groups. These are the paper's intended contributions.
However, the paper additionally suggests that individual medical expenditures are associated with lower wages, regardless of gender. That finding cannot be related to changes in productivity or reduced absenteeism due to improved health because the mandate does not include a policy change which will alter the current health status of MEPS respondents. The claim is not that firms are able to determine the expected medical expenditures of every individual precisely. An insurance company could not do that for individual customers, either. The idea here is only that (1) medical expenditures during the time period studied are at least a weak predictor of future medical expenditures and (2) employers can infer enough to determine which workers will tend to have higher medical expenditures even after considering gender, race, age, or other easily-observable characteristics.
As a caveat, it is likely that the effect of the employer mandate on wages will increase once ESI is in place and the expected costs of coverage become the actual medical expenditures of employees. However, it is not clear that these will be empirically detectable. Any effort to identify those effects would need to account for anticipatory effects and separate the full implementation of the employer mandate from the effect of other ACA provisions. 8 Indeed, the effect of gender on wages might then be statistically different from zero even after controlling for individual medical expenditures. However, given the other ACA provisions, it might not be possible to causally relate such a finding solely to ESI.
The paper proceeds with a review of the literature on employment benefits and their effects on labor market outcomes in Section 2. The value of this paper's approach and its alternative identification strategy are also laid out. Section 3 explains the data used in this paper and the estimation strategy used to produce the estimates in Section 4. The findings show existing work on this topic is likely picking up unobservable differences between firms that do and do not offer ESI and even if they were not, individual-specific effects rather than gender-specific effects are potentially a more important source of wage differences when ESI is offered to employees.
Section 5 examines the robustness of these findings. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature and Background Summers (1989) was the first to call for research into the empirical regularities of employment benefits. Summers was concerned that unless wages were free to adjust for the different cost of providing mandated benefits to different groups then mandated benefits would exclude certain workers from the labor market.
Authors such as Gruber (1993 Gruber ( , 1994 , Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2009) , Schwab (2011), Lahey (2012) , Bailey (2013) , and others answered Summers' call. They found that workers who are affected by mandated benefits face either negative effects on wages, employment, or both because the benefit makes these workers more costly to employ, all else equal. Cowan and Schwab (2016) contribute by examining the role of ESI in the gender wage gap.
They find that female workers, because they tend to have higher annual medical expenditures, experience relatively lower wages at firms that offer ESI. Their work makes a contribution to a body of research that attempts to explain the empirical gap in wages between men and women including Waldfogel (1998) , Altonji and Blank (1999) , Blau and Kahn (2000) , Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) , Manning and Saidi (2010) , Bertrand et al. (2010), and Goldin (2014) .
Cowan and Schwab's work is particularly related to Daneshvary and Clauretie (2007) who also tried to tease out how the presence of health insurance could cause some portion of the gender wage gap. Daneshvary and Clauretie find little evidence that females receive lower wages due to ESI. However, their identification strategy relies on spousal job characteristics as an instrumental variable. As a result, their approach is highly sensitive to alternate specifications and has exogeneity concerns. Cowan and Schwab, using Table 1 ) that wages at firms who offer ESI are higher for males and females than at firms who do not offer ESI. This is likely due to a combination of observable characteristics such as firm size and unobservable factors which affect productivity. 9 Cowan and Schwab implicitly assume that those effects do not differ by gender.
The literature on firm size and wages suggests a similarly able worker will earn less at a small firm. The reasons for this are examined by Oi and Idson (1999) . For this paper, what matters is that workers with higher productivity appear to earn lower wages at smaller firms compared to larger firms. As ESI is highly correlated with firm size, the previous sentence could replace the words "smaller firms" and "larger firms" with "firms that do not offer ESI" and "firms that offer ESI." 10 Oi and Idson (1999) for an overview of the firm size wage premium. More recent evidence (Even and Macpherson, 2012) implicitly assume that firm size affects male and female employees equally. This may not be the case if the empirical gender wage gap is due to occupational choices, individual preferences for in-kind benefits, or unobserved productivity differences.
In particular, if any portion of the gender wage gap is due to productivity differences then the gap between male and female wages will tend to increase with firm size regardless of ESI. In other words, firm size will magnify the effect of any existing productivity differences between two groups. If those two groups also have differences in medical expenditures (which may also lead to further productivity differences), the effect of ESI on the wage gap between them becomes indistinguishable from the effect of firm size. The goal here is not to suggest that the effects Cowan and Schwab attribute to ESI are entirely due to firm size. It is only to note that there are potentially many differences across firms who do and do not offer ESI, firm size being just one of them. Specifically, this paper's empirical findings do not imply any causal relationship between firm size and the gender wage gap.
As there are potentially unobserved relationships between gender, wages, productivity, and selection into ESI (see Simon, 2001) , the ideal source of identification is an exogenous change in the provision of ESI while holding other firm characteristics constant, including (but not limited to) firm size. This would allow the researcher to isolate the effect of ESI from other confounding differences on the firm's demand for labor (and, in turn, on wages).
The Affordable Care Act's employer mandate provides such a source of identification.
Passed in 2010, the Affordable Care Act requires firms with more than 50 full-time equivalent employees to provide health coverage from 2014 onwards to full time workers (those who work over 29 hours in a usual week). 12 While over 80% of workers who work at a firm with more than 50 employees were already offered ESI, many would receive ESI in the immediate future. If females are more costly to cover, then relative demand for male and female workers should change at firms who must provide cover due to the Act's mandate. First, this provides a clean source of identification to re-examine Cowan and Schwab's findings. Second, the MEPS data allow for an examination of how individual medical expenditures rather than just gender affect labor market outcomes. Conveniently for this paper, the ACA's mandate also creates two "control" groups who either (1) already receive coverage from their employer or (2) are not covered by the Act's provisions. The next section describes this data, along with the approach to identification and estimation.
Data and Estimation
This section first describes the data used in the paper and why that data was chosen. The section then considers the conceptual economic concepts that can be examined and the estimation framework required to do so.
Data and Sample Selection
The empirical analysis in this paper uses data from Crucially for this paper, the MEPS data identifies workers who are placed in ACA "limbo" from 2011 to the end of 2014. That is, the MEPS data can be used to construct a sample which identifies only workers at firms with more than 50 employees who do not already have ESI. Firm size is constructed via the answers to two MEPS questions: (1) how many employees work at your work location and (2) how many locations does your employer have? This means it is not possible to determine the exact size of every firm each respondent works at. For example, for an individual who reports 30 employees at their location but also more than one firm location it is not clear if that firm would be covered by the employer mandate. There is no way to know if they have 50 full time employees or not. This makes it challenging to use the 50 employee cut off as an alternate source of variation in an RD-style approach.
It would be possible to pursue that approach by ignoring all MEPS respondents who work at firms with more than one location. However, that would examine only the employer mandate's effect at single-location firms. It would also reduce the sample size dramatically. It is not clear if those results would be informative. More problematic is the fact that it would not be a clean RD.
Firm size is not immutable: firms close to the 50 employee cut-off might downsize in response to the ACA's mandates. Estimates in Section 4 are biased towards zero if firms downsize in order to avoid the employer mandate. However, the estimates are almost identical when workers at firms with fewer than 75 employees are excluded. That suggests that firm downsizing in response to the mandate is not a significant source of bias in this paper's findings. Relevant summary statistics for males and females at firms who do and do not offer coverage, are presented in Table 1 . 14 This paper's empirical findings mainly rely upon the first end-of-year interviews for Panels 11 through 19 of the MEPS covering from the end of 2006 to the end of 2014. As many crucial variables, such as health care expenditures, are reported as an annual figure, the analysis cannot meaningfully exploit more than the end-of-year interviews reported in the MEPS data.
Pooling the sample and ignoring the panel nature of the data is indicated to be problematic by a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test. Moreover, Hausman tests indicate a fixed rather than random effects estimation would be appropriate. However, the lack of variation over such a 14 The data description in this section borrows liberally from Lennon (2017) . The number of observations refers to the number of observations for which hourly wages was reported. As such, the sample only considers those who report that they worked for a wage during the survey period.
short time period confounds a fixed effects panel-data approach to the analysis. 15 In particular, a fixed effects approach cannot be used to study the effect of gender as it is time invariant.
Instead, the data is treated as a repeated cross-section by dropping the second interview with each respondent (repeating the analysis with just those observations produces similar findings but requires that one year of recent data be ignored as Panel 19 contains just one end-of-year interview at the time of writing).
Those under 27 are excluded from the empirical estimates because the ACA affected them via the dependent coverage mandate. Antwi et al. (2013) , Depew (2015) , Hahn and Yang (2016) ,
and Goda et al. (2016) examine how the dependent mandate affected younger workers' labor supply. 16 Workers aged 60 and over are excluded because they could be expected to retire prior to or very shortly after the mandate's implementation.
The paper relies on an assumption that employers are forward-looking and therefore uses data from the ACA's "pre-implementation" period. This covers the years after the announcement of the employer mandate in 2010 but prior to its full implementation in 2015. 17 Highlighting the importance of a swift response to the law, firms were to be experience-rated based on their employee pool in 2013. As a result, changes to personnel in response to the ACA's requirements would need to be made by late 2012.
Firms could have ignored their responsibilities under the mandate but there would be significant financial penalties for doing so. In particular, firms who did not comply would have to pay an "Employer Shared Responsibility Payment" of $2,000 per employee (employers could exclude 30 full-time employees from the penalty calculation). Given a significant body of empirical evidence (see Section 2) suggests relative wages can be adjusted to pay for ESI (because 15 Even variables such as age and college education are not significant determinants of wages in fixed effects estimations and non-varying attributes such as race and gender have to be dropped. 16 The findings in the paper do not change substantially if the analysis is extended to include the relatively small number of individuals aged 26 or younger in the data.
17 As Lennon (2017) notes the health insurance industry reacted swiftly and there is ample evidence that insurers had developed comprehensive reports advising firms of the Act's regulatory changes and how to prepare for them by mid-2011. A typical example is the Hudson Institute report for franchise owners dated September 2011 http://www. franchise.org/sites/default/files/ek-pdfs/html page/The Effects of PPACA on Franchising Final 0.pdf. Accessed November 2016.
workers value the coverage) and the existing tax treatment of employee medical expenditures, it would make little sense not to comply with the mandate. 18 A shorter implementation period might aid identification but this paper is not alone in using the pre-implementation period to study the ACA's effects. Garrett and Kaestner (2015) , Mathur et al. (2016) , and Even and MacPherson (2015) consider if the ACA caused an increase in part-time employment as the Act only mandates coverage to those who work full-time (more than 30 hours per week). Each of these authors relies on the same assumption that employers are forward-looking and will not wait until the mandate is in place to make changes to the composition of their workforce.
Complicating matters in the other direction, authors interested in the effects of the ACA on the labor market cannot simply wait until after all provisions are in place as (even if employers wait to react) confounding variation will be introduced by the ACA's individual health care exchanges. These exchanges opened in 2014 and render clean identification using the employer mandate difficult as they might affect incentives to participate in the labor market on both the intensive and extensive margins. 19
Conceptual Framework
Economic theory predicts that workers, rather than employers, will bear the costs of ESI.
Following Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2009) and Lennon (2017) , in a competitive market where wages are the only form of compensation, the wage of worker i, w i , will equal the value of her marginal product (MRP i ). If health insurance is provided as an employment benefit, a competitive labor market would require wages to be modified to account for the cost of coverage.
If premiums are actuarially fair a worker with medical expenditures e i adds premium p ik to firm k's costs and an employer could pool all medical costs across their N employees so that wages for worker i at firm k are
18 Wages for existing workers do not have to go down, simply increase at different rates. 19 Data from 2014 is included in the results in this paper as (1) the employer mandate did not come into effect until 2015, (2) the health insurance exchanges were slow to sign up enrollees, and (3) few enrollees were full-time employees aged 27-59. Moreover, the findings are little different if 2014 is excluded from the analysis. For that reason, the literature has supposed that a firm's N employees can be partitioned into j ≤ N subgroups. If j = N then subgroups are individual workers. Generally, authors who study how health coverage affects wages have dismissed that possibility without evidence. Usually, their data forces them to do so.
In contrast, this paper uses data which includes individual medical expenditures and does not need to make the same restrictive assumption. Let each of the subgroups be denoted as n j .
For i ∈ n j , then wages (excusing the abuse of notation) for worker i would be
In such a case, the wages of each member of each group will be adjusted by the average medical expenditures of the group (p jk ). This is potentially an equilibrium if the costs of searching for profitable deviations exceed the benefits.
Many authors have found evidence of this kind of group-specific wage offset, including Gruber (1993) , Sheiner (1999) , Jensen and Morrisey (2001) , Lahey (2012), and Bailey (2014) .
This paper complements their work by examining how the relationship between gender and wages changes for working adults aged 27-59 at firms affected by the employer mandate in the years after the mandate was announced. This approach improves on the existing literature because the employer mandate requires coverage exogenously at the federal level. As a result, it avoids comparisons across firms who do and do not choose to offer coverage.
Estimation
The empirical work in this paper follows Cowan and Schwab by focusing on a difference-indifference approach to estimation. Intuitively, the idea is to first compare the difference in wages for males and females with ESI (or at certain firm sizes) to those without ESI to replicate Cowan which affect all workers equally at firms that offer ESI. The co-efficient on the interaction of these two terms in the estimating equation gives a measure of the effect of ESI on wages as a function of gender. The estimating equation is completed by allowing for a set of typical demographic controls X it such as age, sex, education, marital status, race, location, and industry.
The concern with Cowan and Schwab's approach becomes clearer by examining the basic estimating equation common to both this and their paper. While Cowan and Schwab control for economy-wide differences in wages caused by unobservable differences across genders (the reason for that gap is not crucial to the analysis) and also control for wages as a function of ESI, their interaction term is assumed to represent only the effect of ESI on wages by gender.
However, if whatever is driving the gender wage gap (discrimination, unobservable productivity, and so on) is also a function of firm characteristics that are correlated with ESI then identification becomes clouded. If there is such a relationship, a difference-in-difference estimation of the effect of ESI and gender on wages will pick up a mechanical association that is not caused by ESI.
Cowan and Schwab do consider that "it is possible that the provision of ESI is correlated with other job characteristics that lead to a larger female wage gap in those firms that provide it than in firms that do not." They use the presence of other fringe benefits (pp. 111) as a check on this theory. The benefits they examine include training programs, profit sharing, retirement plans, childcare, dental insurance, flexible work schedules, life insurance, and parental (not only maternity) leave. They claim these benefits are not generally costlier by gender so that there should be no association between gender and wages as a function of those benefits. If
Cowan and Schwab were to find such a relationship then it would suggest that other differences between firms that offer fringe benefits and those that don't is driving their results. However, there are several caveats to their approach.
Firstly, each of their regression estimates also controls for ESI. If ESI is generally also offered by firms who offer those other benefits, then it becomes difficult to separate the two effects.
As an example, imagine 100 workers, 80 of whom work at a firm with ESI and 20 at a firm that does not. Of those with ESI, suppose 60 are also offered life insurance while none of the non-ESI firms offers other fringe benefits. Then, assume the gender wage gap is truly larger at firms who offer ESI (but perhaps due to other job characteristics 
Empirical Findings
The first two columns in Table 2 are a replication of Cowan and Schwab's main findings both with and without demographic, region, and industry controls. The estimates use MEPS data in combination with the difference-in-difference estimating equation laid out in Section 3.
The dependent variable is hourly wages in each specification. The interaction term "Offered Coverage × Male" shows males receive relatively higher wages when employed at firms who offer coverage. That is, as Cowan and Schwab found, females receive relatively lower wages when they work at a firm which offers ESI. Strictly speaking, Cowan and Schwab use "holds coverage" but the results change little using one or the other as take-up is 85-90%. 21 The results using "offered coverage" are presented here to align better with later estimates using the ACA's employer mandate for identification. 22
In the second pair of estimates (columns three and four) the estimating equation is altered slightly. It substitutes a continuous measure of firm size (in 100s of employees) for the dummy for ESI. The third column shows an estimation without typical controls while the fourth column includes a complete set of controls. There, the term "Male × No. of Employees" shows that for every one hundred employees hourly wages increase $1.10 per hour for all workers and by an additional $0.15 for men. The trouble this finding causes is that it is hard to explain these findings without suggesting firm size and productivity are related. However, if that is the case, then we would not expect two workers with similar ability to have the same gap in their wages across firm sizes. Rounding out the problem, as ESI is typically offered at all larger firms it is not clear that ESI is the cause of Cowan and Schwab's findings (as replicated in the first two columns of the table). Again, note that this paper is not attempting to explain away Cowan and 20 As mentioned earlier, Cowan and Schwab also consider if the gender gap between ESI and no-ESI firms could be caused by selection into ESI firms by females who might value coverage more (and are then willing to accept lower wages). They find little evidence for that theory but there are again certain caveats to their approach (see Section 2).
21 See Table 1 . 22 As the mandate changes the requirement to offer coverage, that is the variable of interest. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All dollar amounts were adjusted to 2014 dollars using the CPI (www.bls.gov). The demographic controls include gender, marital status, age (cubic), race, and education as appropriate given the co-efficient of interest in the specification. The firm size effect uses binary dummies for the firm size buckets presented in Table 1 .
Schwab's findings via firm size. The paper is agnostic about the source of firm size-related wage differences. The point of the exercise is simply to show that holding ESI is not the only different determinant of wages workers who are studied in Cowan and Schwab's paper experience.
In addition to firm size, their overall hypothesis is testable by appealing to other groups of workers that have patterns in wages and medical expenditures that differ from the patterns of men and women. For example, white and black workers have a well-established wage gap but blacks tend to have similar or slightly lower medical expenses (see Altonji and Blank, 1999 for an overview). In Table 1 , the summary statistics from the 2006-2014 MEPS data show white workers are paid more per hour than black workers but medical expenditures are slightly lower for blacks. In contrast, females are paid less than men but have higher medical expenses. This means that if ESI causes the gender wage gap to widen, then ESI should reduce or at least not exacerbate the black-white wage gap. The estimates from an exercise to test this claim are presented in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 2 . 23 As can be seen, even though the prediction would be that firms with ESI should have a similar or perhaps slightly smaller black-white wage gap, the effect is the opposite. Moreover, the effect is larger in size than the gender effect seen in columns one and two. This suggests that firms with ESI are different in ways that magnify existing differences in wages between groups. That is, there is a larger gender wage gap at firms who offer ESI but it may not be because of ESI.
Another group with different wages and medical expenditures are college graduates and non-graduates. College graduates have both higher medical expenditures and higher wages (see Goldin and Katz, 2007 for an overview) . This means that ESI should reduce the wage premium for college-educated employees if Cowan and Schwab's approach to identification is correct. However, if differences in wages are due to firm characteristics and productivity, then the estimates should be the opposite. In columns seven and eight, the estimates show that ESI is associated with a larger college wage premium. Again, this suggests Cowan and Schwab are picking up the fact that, at firms that offer ESI, differentially productive workers will see bigger gaps in their wages not because of ESI but because of other characteristics of firms that offer ESI.
While not presented here, the same basic analysis using any two groups that tend to have different wages (young versus old workers, married versus single workers, migrants versus non-migrants, and so on) finds that ESI is associated with larger wage differences between the two groups regardless of average medical expenditures across the groups. 24 None of the preceding estimations directly imply that ESI has no effect on wages. They only highlight that other factors may be overwhelming the effect of ESI in existing empirical approaches. To obtain clean identification, an exogenous change in ESI status is required that keeps other firm characteristics constant. This is precisely what the ACA's employer mandate does. By requiring employers to provide ESI it forces employers to consider the medical expenditures of their employee pool and to economize along this new dimension as they see fit. 23 The sample is restricted only to whites and blacks for those estimations. 24 Cowan and Schwab find similar patterns of wage gaps for those who smoke and those who are obese which they find reassuring. The logic is that if medical spending causes wage offsets then variables correlated with health should be important. However, both may affect worker productivity directly and via absenteeism: If firms that offer ESI "allow" more productive workers to earn larger wages due to firm characteristics, then obese workers and smokers may not be able to take as much advantage of those characteristics as non-obese and non-smokers can. Table 3 reports estimates of the ESI-related gender wage gap using the ACA's employer mandate for identification. The estimates presented use a similar difference-in-difference estimating equation as in Table 2 . However, instead of comparing the gender wage gap at firms that do and do not offer ESI, it uses the ACA's mandate to examine how the wage gap between males and females changes after the ACA is announced for workers at firms affected by the mandate. The estimating equation is as follows;
In the estimating equation, ACA=1 for the years after 2010. All else is as described in Section 3. Panel A of Table 3 uses this estimaitng equation with data from MEPS that included only employees who are not already offered ESI but who report working at a firm with more than 50 employees -those in ACA "limbo." These are the main estimates of interest. If females are costlier to cover, then male wages at firms who must provide ESI will increase relative to females.
Panel B is the first falsification exercise. It focuses on those who work at a firm that offers ESI already. These estimates are presented to help ensure the effects seen in Panel A are causally related to the ACA's mandate. For firms that already offered ESI, the employer mandate does not change their incentives and therefore estimates should not show any ACA-related effects.
The estimates in the first two columns of Panel A show a positive relationship between male wages and the mandated coverage required by the ACA. The effect is statistically significant at the 5% level in the specification with a full set of controls in column two. Given they are in 2014 dollars, the size of the estimates align reasonably well with the $.50-$1.50 range Cowan and Schwab suggest (which were in 2002 dollars). 25 Column four shows similar effects on wages when using log wages as the dependent variable.
The estimates in columns six through nine provide confidence in the identification strategy.
These columns present a repeat of the falsification tests using race and college education from Table 2 . In Table 2 The estimates presented here use a similar estimating equation as in Table 2 . However, instead of comparing the gender wage gap at firms that do and do not offer ESI, it uses the ACA's mandate to examine how the gender wage gap changes after the ACA is announced. Panel A focuses only on those who are not already offered ESI. These are the main estimates of interest. Panel B focuses on those who work at a firm that offers ESI already to ensure the effects seen in Panel A are because of the ACA's mandate. The employer mandate does not change the incentives for firms that already offer ESI and therefore the estimates should not show any ACA-related effects. All estimations include a year fixed effect to ensure overall economic conditions are not driving observed changes. A quadratic time trend produces similar results. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All dollar amounts were adjusted to 2014 dollars using the CPI (www.bls.gov). The demographic controls include controls for gender, marital status, age (cubic), race, and education as appropriate given the co-efficient of interest in the specification. The firm size effect uses binary dummies for the firm size buckets presented in Table 1. expenditures would predict. Given Caucasians tend to have slightly higher medical expenditures the passage of the employer mandate should slightly lower the black-white wage gap at firms who must offer ESI in the near future. While not significantly different from zero the direction of the "ACA × Caucasian" term is as expected. The gap between medical expenditures is small so it is not surprising that its effect is not detectable in a sample of 2,500 or so. In contrast, the gap between medical expenditures for college and non-college graduates is quite large and the direction and size of the "ACA × College Educated" effect in columns eight and nine is reassuring. Note, again, that Cowan and Schwab's approach to the question of how ESI affects wages led to the opposite findings.
These estimates resolve concerns with the existing literature on this topic but do not address the important question of group versus individual effects. In column three of Panel A (and B) of Table 3 , the same estimation as in column two is repeated with a control for medical expenditures at the individual level and its interaction with the passage of the ACA's mandate. 26 In the specification, the "ACA × Male" effect decreases in size and is no longer statistically significant when controls for individual medical expenditures are introduced. Column five presents the same estimation, with similar observed effects, using log hourly wages as the dependent variable.
The estimates suggest that gender is acting a proxy for individual medical expenditures so that when estimations do not control for both gender and individual expenditures, differences in spending across genders are soaked up by the gender term.
What is interesting is that research on the effect of ESI has used differences in health status and/or medical expenditure across groups to identify wage effects. None of those papers, including Gruber (1993 Gruber ( , 1994 , Sheiner (1999) , Jensen and Morrisey (2001) , Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2009 ), Cowan and Schwab (2011 ), Lahey (2012 ), and Bailey (2013 (in log form in column four), a specification with a full set of typical controls, the effect of "ACA × Male" is negative but not statistically different from zero. Moreover, in column four, the interaction term suggests there are no changes in the effect of individual medical expenditures after the ACA is announced at firms who already offer coverage, as expected. Interestingly, the estimates seen in columns six through nine suggest that the ACA also affected the wages of college educated and Caucasian workers negatively -but not by as much -at firms who already offered ESI. This suggests that some but not all of the effects seen in columns six through nine Panel A reflect changes in the labor market that are unrelated to the ACA.
Overall, the estimates in Table 2 suggest that Cowan and Schwab's approach likely picked up more than just the effect of ESI on wages for groups with different medical expenditures. The estimates presented in Table 3 , using the ACA's employer mandate for identification, concord much better with a theory that ESI affects wages for groups with different medical expenditures.
The fact that the effect on wages is responsive to the group differences in medical expenditures appropriately for each group highlights the value of using the mandate for identification.
The estimates also suggest that firms can respond to more than just group differences as the effect of gender on wages is not robust to controls for individual medical expenditures. The next section provides robustness and further falsification tests of both the identifying power of the mandate and the importance of individual medical expenditures when asking how ESI affects wages for different groups. 
Robustness
This section focuses on ensuring the ACA's mandate, rather than labor market trends or other events, is responsible for the effects observed.
Parallel Trends
The estimates seen in Table 3 In the figures, the relationships of interest are plotted by year. Figure 1 shows the additional wages earned by men at firms that offer ESI and do not offer ESI. In Figure 2 the effect of medical expenditures on wages is plotted by year at firms with ESI and without ESI. They both suggest Specifically, in Figure 1 the dotted line shows that the gender wage gap was basically no different before and after 2010 for employees at firms who already offer ESI. This suggests that the ACA had little to no effect on the employees at these firms, as would be expected. Given over 80% of the sample worked at firms with ESI during the time period, it is therefore likely that there were also no other (unaccounted for) trends affecting the labor market that affected the gender wage gap.
In contrast, the solid line shows that at firms that do not offer ESI, the gender wage gap begins to converge to that of the firms with ESI as it approaches 2014 (the implementation date of the ACA's mandate). This is suggestive that the effect of the employer mandate was to make firms who did not offer coverage begin to treat their employees the same as firms who did offer ESI.
In sum, Figure 1 suggests that it is some event that only impacted firms who did not offer ESI around 2010 or 2011 that is the causal force driving the effects seen in Section 4. It is possible that event may not have been the announcement of the ACA's employer mandate. However, the patterns in the data and the concentration of changes in wages at firms affected by the ACA's mandate (and on exactly those workers who cost more to cover) suggests that separating the effect of the employer mandate from some other event that could be the cause of the observed patterns would be challenging. 
Firm Size and Mandate Impact
The ACA's mandate applies only to firms with more than 50 full time employees. For that reason, the estimates presented in Table 4 repeat those in Table 3 but include only those who work at a firm with fewer than 50 employees who does not offer ESI. As the employer mandate does not apply to those firms the estimates should mimic the "no effect" findings in Panel B of Table 3 which focused on firms who already offer coverage (the ACA's mandate did not change their incentives). Table 4 shows that the effects on wage gaps at firms with fewer than 50 employees are remarkably similar to Panel B of Table 3 across all specifications. They show no statistically significant changes in the relationship between gender, race, education, or medical expenditures and wages. This suggests that labor market outcomes after 2010 were not affected both for employees of firms who already offered ESI and for those who work at firms not affected by the ACA due to their small size (fewer than 50 employees).
This provides reassurance that the estimates in Tables 2 and 3 can be considered as the effects of the Affordable Care Act's employer mandate. Those tables show wages for males are higher than for females once firms affected by the ACA know they must provide ESI but no 
Changes in Female Labor Supply
Cowan and Schwab consider if selection could be driving their findings. The concern they have is that females may value having ESI more than males. If so, their labor supply towards firms who offer ESI will be relatively higher than males. If that is the case, it means females pay for their coverage via a labor supply response rather than labor demand. The same would be true in this paper if females increased their relative supply of labor to firms affected by the ACA's mandate in advance of the mandate. However, changes in labor supply do not undermine the main takeaway. In either case, females earn less due to ESI.
For several reasons, it is unlikely that the effects seen in this paper are due to changes in labor supply. One reason is an asymmetry between the knowledge of employers and their employees.
The employer is likely to know if they will be subject to the mandate: will they have 50 full-time employees or not after implementation, can they move towards more part-time workers to avoid providing coverage, can they increase their reliance on capital rather than labor in order to reduce their exposure, what will coverage cost the firm, how much will contributions be from employees, and so on. In addition, many individuals who work at firms without coverage would These claims are supported by the data which shows little change in the proportion of males and females working at firms affected by the mandate after 2010. Figure 3 shows the share of male workers over time at firms with 50 employees or more by ESI. Firms who do not have ESI already in place for employees are denoted as "Must Provide ESI". There is little change in the share of male workers at these firms: if anything it is higher after 2010 than before. If females were increasing labor supply towards these firms, the share of males should decline. unlikely that the results seen in the paper are due to changes in female labor supply.
This paper builds upon work by Cowan and Schwab (2016) which suggests female wages are lower because females disproportionately add to the cost of employee health coverage. First, the paper shows that Cowan and Schwab's identification strategy is not ideal and may have led them to uncover a mechanical relationship between ESI and wages that is actually determined by other firm characteristics such as firm size.
The paper then tests for this mechanical relationship by repeating Cowan and Schwab's approach using other groups who have well-documented wage gaps but differences in medical expenditures which should reduce rather than exacerbate the gap when a firm offers ESI.
Examples include blacks versus whites and having a college education or not. Estimates using these alternate groups show that the presence of ESI increases the gap in wages between groups when it should have no or the opposite effect. This means that Cowan and Schwab's findings are, at least in part, driven by a mechanical association between firm size, productivity, ESI, and wages.
As females should, in theory, be paid less than males in the presence of ESI, this paper then tests for the same effects using an alternate source of identification: the ACA's employer mandate. The exogenous nature of the mandate makes it ideal for studying the question at hand and indeed, there appears to be a relationship between the gender wage gap and ESI.
However, the paper then shows that the effect fades in size and significance once controls for individual medical expenditures are introduced. That is, males and females with similar levels of expenditures can expect a similar wage offset due to ESI.
The robustness of these estimates is considered in Section 5. The section mainly focuses on whether or not the ACA can be considered a valid source of identification. The section illustrates that the relationships studied only change at firms with more than 50 employees that did not already offer ESI to their employees and only after 2010. These are precisely the firms who are affected by the ACA and precisely the time period the ACA impacts. Moreover, the firms affected by the mandate begin to treat employees like firms who already offered ESI. The timing of the observed effects and the fact that they appear to converge towards the behavior of firms who already offered ESI suggest the ACA's mandate is what is driving the observed effects.
The figures in Section 5 consider how the gender wage gap and the relationship between wages and medical expenditures change on a year-by-year basis. This gives the reader a sense of the effect placebo tests on the Act's timing would uncover because they highlight the importance of the post-2010 (post-ACA) time period to the findings. As there is no evidence of other changes affecting the labor market the findings can be considered causal.
In summary, ESI is likely associated with observable and unobservable firm characteristics that affect wages and productivity. This ensures identification of ESI's effect on wages is challenging. The ACA's employer mandate resolves most of these issues (but perhaps has issues of its own, such as the multi-year pre-implementation period). Using the mandate for identification shows that requiring ESI causes relative wages to fall for groups who are more costly to cover and vice-versa. However, these findings are not robust to controlling for individual medical expenditures suggesting the effects of ESI on individual wages reflect market forces and incentives. The system of ESI potentially provides coverage to individuals at the "right" price -lower wages for those with larger expenditures and higher wages for those who do not cost employers as much to cover, regardless of gender.
